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FOREWORD:

RECONSIDERATIONS OF DIRECTOR AND LEVI'S

Law and the Future
William H. Page*
This Symposium marks the fortieth anniversary of Aaron Director and Edward
Levi's seminal article, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation,' which articulated
for the first time the essential elements of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis. We reproduce Law and the Future, and offer a variety of new commentary
by five distinguished antitrust scholars. In addition, we present the proceedings
of an electronic forum in which a wider circle of antitrust scholars discussed the
principal articles. In this Foreword, I will offer a few observations on Director
and Levi's article, then introduce our principal essays.
In their article, Director and Levi announce that "the conclusions of economics
do not justify the application of the antitrust laws in many situations in which
[they] are now being applied, 2 and propose to "direct attention to certain problem
areas for study."' The remainder of the article consists of sixteen pages of terse
remarks, with only thirty-seven footnotes and no subheadings. On the last page,
the authors predict that "in the future there may well be a recognition of the instability of the assumed foundation for some major antitrust doctrines. And this may
lead to a re-evaluation of the scope and function of the antitrust laws."'
These predictions have proven remarkably prescient. Perhaps the article's
greatest achievement is to set out (albeit in schematic form) a research program
that challenged and ultimately overthrew the existing antitrust orthodoxy. The
few pages of Director and Levi's article contain, in germinal form, most of the
principal ideas of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis. As James May notes
in his essay below,' all of the major antitrust scholars in the Chicago tradition
have acknowledged their debt to its ideas. Although (astonishingly) no federal
court has ever cited the article, its ideas have transformed antitrust law over the
past forty years.6
Director and Levi propose to discuss three "new" problems: how the law
should view large firm size that was not acquired by merger; how the law should
view abusive or exclusionary practices that are said to create or extend monopoly
power; and how to characterize agreements among competitors.7 We can now
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1. Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281
(1956), reprintedin 17 Miss. C. L. RFv. 7 (1996).
2. Id. at 282.
3. Id. at281.
4. Id. at 296.
5. James May, Redirecting the Future: Law and the Future and the Seeds of Change in Modern Antitrust
Law, 17 Miss. C. L. REv. 43 (1996).
6. See generally William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
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recognize the authors' approach to these questions as distinctively Chicagoan. In
the course of their discussion, Director and Levi
" focus on various practices' effects on economic efficiency rather than on
fairness or "other objectives."8
" measure practices' competitive effects by their likely effect on output,9 particularly questioning the idea of unmeasurable "incipient" reductions in
competition.'1

* express special concern for the effects of antitrust rules on productive efficiency.11
" suggest that monopolies and cartels are usually "self-correcting" primarily
because of new entry.12
" advocate use of the determinate, neoclassical models of monopoly, dominant
firms, and cartels rather than the indeterminate models of oligopoly pricing
as guides to antitrust policy."
" assess a practice's likely competitive effects by asking if the practice would
be a rational way of gaining monopoly profits. 4
" reject the idea of "leverage" as an explanation for most abusive practices
like tying, vertical integration, and exclusive dealing.'"
" explain many abusive practices as means of price discrimination which
exploits but does not extend monopoly power, and may even expand production."
These ideas have become commonplace in Chicago scholarship and have, as
the authors predicted, deeply influenced judicial decisionmaking. Director and
Levi may even have predicted the form in which the transformation of antitrust
law would occur. They wrote that even if the economic analysis showed the law
to be ill-founded, the effect on the law might not be immediate. "The main lines
of the law, then, may remain the same, but the statement of reasons for the law
may change, and this in itself should have an interstitial effect in the cases."'"
This sentence describes, in capsule form, what has indeed happened in antitrust.
The Supreme Court has not overruled any antitrust precedents since Continental
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 8 twenty years ago. Instead, it has reconceptual-

ized long-standing antitrust doctrine in terms of economic efficiency, and this
process has markedly affected the application of those rules.19
8. Id. at 285.
9. Id. at 287, 294.
10. Id. at 281.
11. Id. at 285-86.
12. Id. at 285 (monopoly), 294 (cartels).
13. Id. at 287.
14. Id. at 290.
15. Id. at 290-91.
16. Id. at 287.
17. Id. at 282.
18. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
19. Page, supra note 6; see also William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44
EMORY L.J. 1 (1995).
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The essays in this Symposium take a wide variety of approaches in their reconsiderations of Director and Levi. Ian Ayres addresses the problem of firms that
have achieved large market share without combination and without abusive practices.20 It is a paradox in antitrust law that straightforward monopoly pricing is
not unlawful monopolization. Professor Ayres shows that there is much to be
gained in finding a practical policy to deter monopolists from exacting the last
increment of the monopoly price. The envelope theorem shows that this last
increment provides very little additional monopoly profit to the firm, but causes
a disproportionate loss in social welfare. If the problems of measurement and
administration could be overcome, a policy that induced monopolists to charge a
lower price could produce large social benefits.
John Lopatka focuses on Director and Levi's treatment of the problem of
monopolistic abuses.2 1 He shows that, although Director and Levi were skeptical
of the claim that firms can use monopoly power to harm competitors, they did
not deny that such abuses could occur. Indeed, in a suggestive aside, Director
and Levi anticipated the modem "post-Chicago" literature on raising rivals costs.
Professor Lopatka shows, however, that there are important ideological differences between Chicagoans and post-Chicagoans over the frequency of successful
nonprice exclusion and the ability of courts to identify it, and these differences
continue to influence antitrust policy choices.
Peter Carstensen views Director and Levi's analysis from a populist perspective.22 He recognizes the authors' insights but points out the rhetorical aspects of
their presentation, as well. He suggests that in analyzing practices, Director and
Levi acknowledge alternative, "noneconomic" approaches, but phrase these
acknowledgments in a way that promotes a limited enforcement agenda.
James May places Law and the Future in the context of the developing ideas of
its authors.2" He strikingly shows how Director's antitrust ideas were continuous
with his libertarian political ideology24 and traces the evolution in Levi's thinking
on the issue of monopolistic abuses. He then shows the similarities and differences between the ideas in Law and the Future and the economic ideas of the
formative period of antitrust. Finally, he shows how the later Chicago School
scholars, particularly Robert Bork, have drawn on, but significantly altered, the
Director and Levi approach.
20. Ian Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theorem, 17 Miss. C. L. REv.
21(1996).
2 1. John E. Lopatka, Exclusion Now and in the Future: Examining Chicago School Orthodoxy, 17 Miss. C.
L. REv. 27 (1996).
22. Peter C. Carstensen, Directorand Levi After 40 Years: The Anti-Antitrust Agenda Revisited, 17 Miss. C.
L. REv. 37 (1996).
23. May, supra note 5.
24. For a discussion of the role of ideology in the early shaping of antitrust, see William H. Page,
Ideological Conflict and the OriginsofAntitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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Fred McChesney suggests that Director and Levi's presentation is too terse to
have set out a research agenda.25 Instead, he views it as a cryptic allusion to a
comprehensive research program already in progress at the University of
Chicago. In the latter half of his article, Professor McChesney speculates that
Director, whose probing intellect challenged everyone at Chicago, would have
turned that intellect to the analysis of the interest-group dynamics of antitrust.
Director and Levi sharply distinguished antitrust as an economic policy from
pernicious "NRA attempts" to regulate the economy directly.28 Some modern
scholars now challenge that distinction between antitrust and regulation,27 and at
least one suggests that the NRA era was actually a golden age of economic policy, precisely because the antitrust laws were suspended.2" Professor McChesney
argues that Director would have come to approve this line of research.
Interestingly, while Professor Carstensen and others in the Symposium emphasize the power of ideas in shaping antitrust law, Professor McChesney directs our
attention to the power of interest group politics.
For a decade, antitrust scholars have struggled to shape a new, "post-Chicago"
approach.29 These essays allow us to revisit the first Chicago synthesis and to
examine its origins. Equally important, they ask what we have learned in forty
years that might alter Director and Levi's outlook. We hope they will contribute
to the debate over the future of antitrust.
25. Fred S. McChesney, Back to Law and the Future, 17 Miss. C. L. REV. 81 (1996).
26. Director & Levi, supra note 1, at 281.
27. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney
& William F. Shugart, II eds., 1995).
28. George Bittlingmayer, Output and Stock Prices When Antitrust is Suspended. The Effects ot the NIRA, in
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27, at 287 (suspension of antitrust caused economic boom).

29. See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-ChicagoEconomics: Economists,
Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669
(1995); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985).

